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176 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 12, No. 2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
resident Barack Obama triggered a War Powers Resolution (WPR)1 
controversy with his military response to the anti-government 
rebellion and civil war in Libya in 2011.2  Members of Congress seized upon 
the WPR, questioning whether the Obama administration had complied with 
the WPR’s requirements when the United States launched the initial Libyan 
Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) and subsequently participated in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Unified Protector (OUP).  
Many legislators charged that President Obama had violated the WPR.3  
Concerns centered on such issues as presidential reliance on the United 
Nations (U.N.) Security Council—rather than Congress—for authorization to 
act, the WPR’s relevance to what some perceived to be humanitarian 
missions, our nation’s role in a larger NATO operation, the Obama 
administration’s definition of “hostilities” under the WPR, and the expiration 
of the WPR’s sixty-day clock (requiring the termination of military 
involvement).4  As debate raged about these and other matters, the WPR’s 
                                                
 1. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48). 
 2. The Obama administration articulated various explanations and justifications of its 
response to the Libya crisis over time.  See, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on 
the Commencement of Military Operations Against Libya, 2011 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 193 
(Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/presidential-letter-
libya [hereinafter Commencement of Military Operations Against Libya]; President Barack 
Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011) 
[hereinafter Address to the Nation on Libya], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya); Memorandum Opinion from 
Caroline D. Krass, Principal Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric  Holder, 
Att’y Gen. (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Krass Memorandum], available at www.justice.gov/ 
olc/opiniondocs/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf; Letter from President Barack Obama to 
John Boehner, Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid & Mitch McConnell (May 20, 2011) [hereinafter 
Letter on Efforts in Libya), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
05/21/world/africa/21libya-text.html?_r=0. 
 3. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S1963–64 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2011) (statement of Sen. Rand 
Paul); 157 CONG. REC. H4015 (daily ed. June 3, 2011) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank); 157 
CONG. REC. H4017 (daily ed. June 3, 2011) (statement of Rep. Brad Sherman); 157 CONG. 
REC. H4019 (daily ed. June 3, 2011) (statement of Rep. Jeff Miller); 157 CONG. REC. S3744 
(daily ed. June 14, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mark Udall). 
 4. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S1951 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2011) (statement of Sen. John 
Ensign); 157 CONG. REC. H2111 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2011) (statement of Rep. Tom 
McClintock); 157 CONG. REC. H4001 (daily ed. June 3, 2011) (statement of Rep. Barbara 
Lee).  See also Angie Holan & Louis Jacobson, Are U.S. Actions in Libya Subject to the War 
Powers Resolution? A Review of the Evidence, POLITIFACT.COM (June 22, 2011, 11:38 AM), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2011/jun/22/are-us-actions-libya-subject-war-
powers-resolution/; Jonathan Broder & Seth Stern, Obama Faces Criticism Over War Powers 
Resolution Interpretation, CQ WKLY., June 27, 2011, at 1368–69. 
 P 
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consultation provisions failed to attract serious congressional scrutiny.5 
Consultation, however, is at the WPR’s core and the prerequisite for the 
law’s stated goal that military ventures be based on the “collective judgment” 
of both Congress and the President.6  Thus, this Article concentrates on the 
subject of consultation and its glaring absence from the congressional 
conversation during the Libya crisis.  After providing background on the 
WPR generally, the consultation requirement more specifically, and the U.S. 
response to the violence in Libya during the Libyan Revolution, I examine 
President Obama’s disregard for the consultation mandate’s letter and spirit.  
I then explore Congress’s muted response to the administration’s 
consultation violations, analyzing why the administration’s non-compliance 
did not spark greater congressional outrage.  The congressional reaction to 
President Obama’s initial failure to consult on U.S. policy in Syria in August 
2013, I also show, conforms to the analysis here.  Finally, I consider what 
this study suggests for the future of the WPR’s consultation obligation.  This 
Article hence highlights a specific WPR topic—consultation—that heretofore 
has received neither dedicated nor significant scholarly attention.7 
To supplement my primary and secondary source research, I sought 
insiders’ perspectives on the relevance of the WPR in the Libya crisis.  This 
Article draws on informal discussions that I had with a dozen key staff 
                                                
 5. Cf. Operation Odyssey Dawn and U.S. Military Operations in Libya: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th Cong. 9 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing on Operation 
Odyssey Dawn] (featuring discussion between Rep. Adam Smith, ranking member of the 
House Armed Services Committee, and Hon. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65802/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg65802.pdf. 
 6. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2006) (discussing the law’s goal of achieving “collective 
judgment”). 
 7. Works on the WPR abound, but do not focus on consultation.  See, e.g., BRIEN 
HALLETT, DECLARING WAR: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND WHAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES 
NOT SAY (2012); RYAN HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON WARS: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, 
AND WAR POWERS (2002); WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS 
GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (2007); Timothy S. Boylan 
& Karen M. Kedrowski, The Constitution and the War Power: What Motivates Congressional 
Behavior?, 30 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 539 (Summer 2004); Eileen Burgin, Rethinking the 
Role of the War Powers Resolution: Congress and the Persian Gulf War, 21 J. LEGIS. 23 
(1995); John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1379 (1988); Louis Fisher, The Baker-Christopher War Powers Commission, 39 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 128 (2009); Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers 
Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1998), available at http://www.consti-
tutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/430.pdf; Glenn A. Phelps & Timothy S. 
Boylan, Discourses of War: The Landscape of Congressional Rhetoric, 28 ARMED FORCES & 
SOC’Y 641 (Summer 2002); Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an 
Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud That Contributed Directly to the 9/11 
Attacks, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 109 (2002); Michael Benjamin Weiner, Note, A Paper 
Tiger with Bite: A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861 
(2007). 
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people, including Democratic and Republican aides in leadership offices, on 
pertinent committees (often in leadership positions), and in the personal 
offices of those integrally involved in the Libya debate.  
 
II.  THE WPR IN BRIEF 
 
The Constitution created a so-called invitation to struggle between 
Congress and the President on war powers (and other foreign policy) issues.8  
The executive branch seemed to prevail in the consequent “tug for more of 
the foreign policy blanket”9 on military matters, particularly after the Korean 
conflict, despite having fewer and less substantial war powers prerogatives 
than Congress.10  To reassert its authority, Congress approved the WPR over 
President Richard Nixon’s veto in 1973.11  The WPR’s objective is “to insure 
that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply 
to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by 
the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces.”12  The law 
requires that Congress be involved in decision making from before the 
takeoff and through the landing via three principal procedures: presidential 
consultation with Congress, executive reports to Congress, and congressional 
action regarding military initiatives.13  Consultation is the foundation in this 
co-determination formula. 14   Presidential consultation with Congress, 
especially prior to troop deployment, ensures that the legislative branch helps 
                                                
 8. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957 (4th ed. 
1957). 
 9. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 284, 285 (1987). 
 10. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990).  In considering 
Congress’s war powers, Glennon argues that the President’s powers “are paltry in comparison 
with, and are subordinate to, [the] grants to Congress.”  Id. at 72.  See also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 69, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stressing that the President 
is less threatening than the British king, for it is Congress’s power, not the President’s, which 
“extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies”) 
(emphases in original).  This is not to imply, of course, that differing interpretations of the war 
power do not exist.  See generally HALLETT, supra note 7; ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976); David Gray Adler, The 
Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1988); J. 
Terry Emerson, The War Powers Resolution Tested: The President’s Independent Defense 
Power, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187 (1975). 
 11. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 5 Pub. Papers 893 (Oct. 24, 1973). 
 12. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (emphasis added).  The WPR also identifies instances in which 
Presidents may introduce U.S. forces.  See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (attempting to link 
executive use of force to Congress’s ability to declare war, a statutory authorization, or an 
attack on this country, its territories, or its military). 
 13. Id. §§ 1542–44. 
 14. See id. § 1542. 
2014 WHERE’S THE CONSULTATION? 179 
 
to establish the policy direction that affects all subsequent choices. 15  
Consultation is not intended to substitute for formal congressional 
authorization to use force, but it is the first required WPR step.16 
No President to date has fully accepted the WPR,17 and Congress has 
never demanded execution of the law as written.18  Nonetheless, the WPR 
remains the law of the land and a focal point for Congress as global events 
periodically catapult it into lawmakers’ minds.  Members have consistently 
questioned presidential military actions in the context of the WPR, because it 
establishes a framework for asserting legislative prerogatives and offers a foil 
for attacking a policy’s substance.19 
 
A. Consultation in the WPR 
 
Consultation, in theory, enables Congress to influence the decision about 
whether, and how, to commence a military initiative.20  According to Section 
3 of the WPR, 
 
The President in every possible instance shall consult with 
Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces 
                                                
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 7 (1973). 
 16. But cf. Fisher & Adler, supra note 7, at 3 (arguing that consultation under the WPR 
may unconstitutionally allow the President to commit troops without prior congressional 
authorization, thereby potentially subverting the underlying goal of collective judgment). 
 17. Every President since the WPR’s enactment, in fact, has argued at some point in his 
tenure that the WPR unconstitutionally infringes upon the President’s role as the Commander-
in-Chief.  See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION: AFTER THIRTY-EIGHT YEARS 6 (2012). 
 18. See generally id. 
 19. See Eileen Burgin, Congress, the War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of 
Panama, 25 POLITY 217 (1992) (reviewing WPR-related activities of legislators in all major 
tests of the law through the 1989 Panama invasion).  Notably, congressional action 
surrounding the WPR was extensive in every military operation in the WPR’s early years—
that is, 1973-1989—except for the 1989 Panama incursion.  Even the 1986 bombing of Libya, 
the case prompting the least WPR activity other than Panama, sparked a noticeable response: 
legislators in 1986 introduced four measures regarding Libya and the WPR; the relevant 
House subcommittee held seven hours of hearings over three days; several members made 
floor statements; and two letters were sent to President Ronald Reagan, one from former 
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell, and the other from a group of 
eight senators and representatives.  Id. at 224.  The congressional patterns established in the 
law’s early years have continued.  In the Persian Gulf War from 1990-1991, the multi-year 
involvement in Somalia beginning in 1992, the former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo 
entanglement starting in 1992, the enforcement of the U.N. embargo against Haiti in 1993, the 
military endeavors prompted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and more, lawmakers have 
continually turned to the WPR to question presidential actions and assert Congress’s 
constitutional powers.  GRIMMETT, supra note 17, at 21–44. 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 7. 
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into hostilities or into situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances, and after every such introduction shall 
consult regularly with the Congress until United States 
Armed Forces are no longer engaged.21 
 
Obvious textual ambiguities in Section 3, however, have allowed for 
divergent congressional and executive interpretations, compounding 
differences in perceived institutional interests that complicate consultation. 
First, what constitutes consultation?  The House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Report on the WPR underscores that consultation is not 
“synonymous with merely being informed,” and means instead “that a 
decision is pending” and that members “are being asked by the President for 
their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of 
action contemplated.” 22   Nevertheless, the executive branch typically 
contends that it has fulfilled consultation obligations through notification 
after the fact, such as through informational briefings in which a fait 
accompli is presented and the counsel of legislators is not solicited.23  When 
Presidents convene these meetings or conference calls, frequently they have 
already issued orders for military action.24  And in terms of content, although 
“meaningful” consultation requires the full sharing of information, 25 
“because information is power[,] . . . presidents and their aides are loath to 
share it.”26 
                                                
 21. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
 22. H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 7. 
 23. Burgin, supra note 19, at 233.  For instance, officials in President Reagan’s 
administration took the position that they had consulted on the Grenada incursion, even though 
congressional leaders were not even informed of the imminent invasion until after President 
Reagan had issued the final order.  See Michael Rubner, The Reagan Administration, the 1973 
War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada, 100 POL. SCI. Q. 627, 630–36 (1986).  
Similarly, in a televised address on the invasion of Panama, President George H. W. Bush 
stated, “I contacted the bipartisan leadership of Congress and informed them of [the] 
decision.”  President George H. W. Bush, Address to the Nation at the White House (Dec. 20, 
1989), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3422.  President Bush’s 
notification on the Panama mission took place just several hours prior to the invasion.  See 
also RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: 
PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 3–11 (2012). 
 24. In the Persian Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush went a step further.  As his 
aides explained, “It’s true we’ve promised to consult Congress if there’s a war.  In other 
words, we’ll phone them just after the first bombs have been dropped.”  PIERRE SALINGER & 
ERIC LAURENT, SECRET DOSSIER: THE HIDDEN AGENDA BEHIND THE GULF WAR 176 (Howard 
Curtis trans.) (1991). 
 25. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 7. 
 26. Michael J. Glennon, Note & Comment, The War Powers Resolution, Once Again, 103 
AM. J. INT’L L. 75, 77 (2009). 
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Second, what situations require consultation?  Presidents have 
interpreted the language to consult “in every possible instance”27 as a license 
to sidestep Section 3, because it allows them to claim that the exigencies of 
the moment prevented consultation.28  Yet the House Report clarifies that the 
term “every” signifies that consultation “should apply in extraordinary and 
emergency circumstances”; the clause more broadly is meant to be 
“simultaneously firm in its expression of congressional authority” and 
“flexible in recognizing the possible need for swift action.”29  Questions also 
surround the terms “hostilities” and “imminent involvement in hostilities,” as 
Presidents are required to consult prior to sending armed forces into such 
potentially dangerous environments. 30   The House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, during consideration of the WPR, substituted “hostilities” and 
“imminent hostilities” for “armed conflict,” deeming those terms to be 
“somewhat broader in scope” than “armed conflict.”31  According to the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee Report, 
 
In addition to a situation in which fighting actually has 
begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation 
in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear 
and present danger of armed conflict.  “Imminent hostilities” 
denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either 
for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed 
conflict.32 
 
Here too, though, Presidents have construed these terms more narrowly than 
Congress intended.33 
Third, who represents Congress for consultation purposes?  The WPR 
states that consultation should be with “Congress.”34  The House-Senate 
Conference Committee chose this inclusive language rather than the House 
version that called for consultation with only party and relevant committee 
leaders.35  Indeed, it is Congress, not a few senior lawmakers, that has the 
constitutional power to declare war.36  The leadership, moreover, may not 
                                                
 27. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
 28. See, e.g., The Situation in Iran: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 96th 
Cong. iii (2d Sess. 1980) [hereinafter Hearing on the Situation in Iran]. 
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 6–7 (emphases in original). 
 30. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 7. 
 32. Id. (emphases in original). 
 33. See GRIMMETT, supra note 17, at 7. 
 34. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
 35. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-547, sec. 3, at 2 (1973). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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even reflect the views of the larger congressional membership, as the debt 
ceiling and other recent crises have illustrated.37  But the obligation to 
consult with “Congress” creates a logistical quandary of how to consult with 
535 individuals.  President George H. W. Bush underscored this challenge, 
along with his constitutional interpretation of the requirement, at a news 
conference regarding the Persian Gulf War: “I cannot consult with 535 
strong-willed individuals.  I can’t do it, nor does my responsibility under the 
Constitution compel me to do that.”38 
 
B. Other Key WPR Provisions: Reporting and Congressional Action 
 
The reporting and congressional action processes, located primarily in 
Sections 4 and 5 of the WPR, supply the mechanisms by which the law 
attempts to ensure congressional participation after a President’s initial 
decision to use force.39  The President is enjoined, under Section 4(a), to 
submit a written report to the House Speaker and the Senate President pro 
tempore within forty-eight hours when, “in the absence of a declaration of 
war,” armed forces are sent into any one of three situations: (1) hostilities or 
imminent hostilities; (2) a foreign nation’s “territory, airspace or waters” 
while “equipped for combat”; or (3) in numbers substantially enlarging pre-
existing forces “equipped for combat” in a foreign country.40  The report 
must explain the conditions compelling military use, the constitutional and 
legislative basis for taking action, and the mission’s estimated scope and 
duration.41  While troops remain in hostile or potentially hostile situations, 
the President is obliged to periodically report to Congress,42 just as he was 
instructed to consult regularly.43 
The Section 4(a)(1) reporting requirements—addressing situations in 
which troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities—relate to 
congressional action in Section 5. 44   Most notably, the Section 4(a)(1) 
reporting mandate launches the Section 5(b) time limitation, which stipulates 
that within sixty days after a Section 4(a)(1) report is “submitted or is 
required to be submitted,” the President must end deployment of forces 
                                                
 37. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: 
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF 
EXTREMISM 3–30 (2012). 
 38. President George H. W. Bush, News Conference at the White House (Nov. 30, 1990), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19119#axzz2jcWmeXyE. 
 39. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543–44. 
 40. Id. § 1543(a). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. § 1543(c). 
 43. Id. § 1542. 
 44. Id. § 1544(b). 
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unless Congress has declared war, has authorized the action, has extended the 
sixty-day period, or cannot convene because of an attack on the United 
States.45  Section 5(b) does allow for the sixty-day period to be lengthened by 
thirty days if necessary for troop removal.46  Presidential failure to label a 
report under Section 4(a)(1) technically does not invalidate the clock-
triggering process, because the time limitation takes effect simply if a 
Section 4(a)(1) report was required.47  Nevertheless, Presidents generally 
have argued that by reporting to Congress “pursuant to” or “consistent with” 
the WPR, the clock does not start ticking. 48   Most joint resolutions 
authorizing the use of force since 1973 have been Section 5(b) statutory 
authorizations under the WPR. 49   Finally, according to Section 5(c), 
Congress may terminate military involvement at any point by passing a 
concurrent resolution.50 
These Section 4 and 5 provisions, relevant once an operation has 
commenced, are intended to keep Congress informed about an ongoing 
military venture and place emphasis on authorization after the fact or on the 
cessation of hostilities.51  (In theory, the clock also may offer Congress a 
mechanism by which to punish an administration for inadequate 
consultation.)  Congressional focus on Sections 4 and 5 tends to immerse 
members in process-related questions and issues of institutional prerogatives 
during a military mission.  Thus, even if faithfully observed, in contrast to 
Section 3, the procedures set forth in Sections 4 and 5 do not facilitate the 
two branches making joint policy choices about military involvement. 
 
III.  FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON CONSULTATION 
 
Part III explores consultation in greater depth.  I consider the 
constitutional basis for the WPR’s Section 3 requirements, why consultation 
                                                
 45. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. And in the one venture in which a President explicitly referred to Section 4(a)(1), the 
clock was irrelevant because U.S. forces were already withdrawing.  See Letter from President 
Gerald Ford on U.S. Actions in the Recovery of the SS Mayaguez, to the Speaker of the House 
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (May 15, 1975) (on file with the Pub. Papers of 
the Presidents). 
 49. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 
102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991). 
 50. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c).  See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 970–71 (1983).  Because 
Chadha cast doubt on the validity of the WPR’s concurrent resolution, Congress passed 
legislation in 1983, substituting a joint resolution for the concurrent resolution.  Although not 
amending the WPR, this measure offers procedures that can be invoked should the Supreme 
Court specifically strike down § 1544(c) of the WPR. 
 51. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 7–12. 
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is a necessary component of collective judgment, the inherent benefits of 
consultation, and legislators’ protests when executives have consistently 
sidestepped the consultation mandate in prior military interventions. 
 
A. Consultation and the Constitution 
 
The WPR’s Section 3 consultation provisions flow from Congress’s 
Article I powers.52  Most pertinent are Congress’s Article I, section 8, 
national security powers (to “declare War,” to “raise and support Armies,” to 
“provide and maintain a Navy,” to “make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation” of the armed forces, and to “provide for calling forth the 
Militia”),53 the necessary and proper clause,54 and the power of the purse.55  
Congress’s power to raise and support armies, for instance, indicates the 
framers’ intentions that instead of maintaining large standing armies during 
peace, armies would be raised at Congress’s direction for war.56  Hence, for a 
President to engage the nation in hostilities, consultation would be essential 
because of executive dependence on Congress for troops.  According to a 
U.S. District Court in Davi v. Laird,57 “the Founding Fathers envisioned 
congressional power to raise and support military forces as providing that 
body with an effective means of controlling presidential use thereof.”58  Early 
exercises of Congress’s war powers also suggest that the powers “extend to 
establishing the scope of hostilities.”59  Even Harold Koh (who, as President 
Obama’s State Department legal advisor, championed the controversial and 
narrow definition of “hostilities” regarding Libya, as discussed below), 
contended in Dellums v. Bush 60  that “the structure and history of the 
Constitution . . . require that the President meaningfully consult with 
Congress . . . before engaging in war.”61  Koh underscored that individual 
lawmakers’ “stray remarks” or “collateral legislative activity” that others 
might construe as “‘acquiescence’ in executive acts” does not constitute 
consultation.62  Consequently, Section 3 may be viewed as a means by which 
                                                
 52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, MICHAEL J. GARCIA & THOMAS J. NICOLA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41989, CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO LIMIT MILITARY OPERATIONS 3–6 (2013). 
 57. 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970). 
 58. Id. at 480. 
 59. ELSEA, GARCIA & NICOLA, supra note 56, at 5. 
 60. 752 F. Supp 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 61. Bruce A. Ackerman et al., Ronald V. Dellums v. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): 
Memorandum Amicus Curiae of Law Professors, 27 STAN. J. INT’L L. 257, 261 (1991). 
 62. Id. 
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Congress can assert its constitutional prerogatives in the war powers 
invitation to struggle.63 
 
B. Why Collective Judgment Requires Consultation 
 
A pre-condition for co-determination is that both Congress and the 
President are fully engaged participants in the decision-making process.  
Through consultation, Congress becomes informed, addressing the natural 
imbalance of information between the branches, and then has the opportunity 
and venue to provide advice and counsel to the executive.  Consultation 
when first determining whether to use force is critical, because that initial 
choice defines and constrains subsequent options.  Without input on a 
possible military endeavor at the start, Congress may become prisoner of a 
fait accompli or may simply be presented with a crash landing.  Once a 
mission is ongoing, disengaging may not be practical; it may affect allies 
who are relying on the United States, or it may be perceived to be more 
damaging than completing the mission.  Questioning a President also 
becomes problematic because the rally-around-the-flag effect emerges and 
members run the risk of being charged with failing to support American 
troops.  Once armed forces are in conflict, as Representative Dennis Ross (R-
FL) lamented, “You can’t unscramble [the] egg.”64 
 No explicit constitutional power granted to Congress can substitute for 
consultation to achieve collective judgment.  Congress’s appropriations 
power, for instance, is neither a replacement for consultation nor a magic 
wand; moreover, it is difficult to use, is a somewhat kludge tool, and has 
limited effectiveness.  Cutting appropriations, or defeating funding for an 
ongoing venture, may not stymie a President from relying on pre-existing 
dollars to act militarily.  To prevent the executive from transferring pre-
existing funds to use for military conflict, Congress would need to pass 
legislation subject to a presidential veto, thus likely requiring a two-thirds 
super-majority in both chambers for an override, a tough hurdle to 
surmount. 65   The veto override obstacle also decreases the viability of 
                                                
 63. Beyond the scope of this Article, but noteworthy, some scholars question whether 
Section 3 unconstitutionally delegates congressional power to the President.  See, e.g., Fisher 
& Adler, supra note 7, at 3 (“Since [Section 3] empowers the president to introduce the troops 
into combat without prior congressional authorization, it . . . vests in the president authority 
that far exceeds his constitutional powers.”); Fisher, supra note 7, at 137 (“The Constitution is 
not designed to ensure that Congress will be ‘consulted’ before the president initiates war.  It 
is written to place singularly in the hands of Congress the decision to take the country from a 
state of peace to a state of war.”). 
 64. Sean Sullivan, A New Twist in GOP Views on Military Intervention, NAT’L J., June 11, 
2011, at 11. 
 65. See MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R98157, CONGRESSIONAL 
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amending an appropriations bill to limit a President’s permissible course of 
action if the President seeks to engage or continues engaging militarily.66  
The appropriations power, furthermore, cannot even facilitate future 
consultation regarding a military mission when a President, without 
consulting, initiates and quickly completes the operation.  Congress can use 
the power of the purse in this situation to retaliate against an unrelated 
presidential endeavor, yet this does not remedy the problem or achieve 
collective judgment.  Similarly, Congress employing its legislative 
prerogatives to rescind a military authorization when U.S. forces are in 
conflict, to establish a statutory deadline for terminating hostilities, or to 
enact a declaration of peace are not alternatives for consultation, and carry 
the added complication of a probable veto.  The practical effect of such 
legislative actions is unclear, as well, if Congress keeps funding the military 
venture.  Appropriation of funds may confer authority for executive military 
maneuvers in contraindication of other congressional measures.67 
 
C. Additional Benefits of Consultation 
 
Beyond supplying a necessary component for collective judgment, 
consultation has other inherent benefits for a President and for U.S. policy 
more broadly.  Former Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), when serving as the 
ranking Foreign Relations Committee member, explained in a committee 
hearing that “going to war without Congress” is neither “wise” nor “helpful 
to the operation.”68  It is prudent to have Congress’s support, because that 
provides protection for the executive and signifies that the American people 
are behind the mission.  Politically, Representative Tom Cole (R-OK) argued 
that “getting Congress involved is simply smart politics. . . . ‘Get as many 
fingerprints on the murder weapon as you can,’ then everybody is on your 
side; they can’t get away.”69 
                                                                                                               
OVERRIDES OF PRESIDENTIAL VETOES  2 (2004). 
 66. Ending a war, consequently, may essentially require a super-majority, whereas starting 
a war presumably requires only a majority. 
 67. Vietnam is the only case in which Congress repealed a military authorization during 
major combat operations.  President Nixon responded by lowering U.S. troop numbers but 
continuing involvement until Congress stopped all funding for military missions in Indochina.  
See ELSEA, GARCIA & NICOLA, supra note 56, at 24–39. 
 68. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 112th Cong. 4 
(2011) [hereinafter Hearing on Libya and War Powers] (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar, 
ranking member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/congress/2011_hr-libya.pdf. 
 69. Broder & Stern, supra note 4, at 1368–69. 
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D. Congressional Responses to Presidential Violations of Section 3  
Over the Years 
 
Despite the theoretical benefits of consultation, presidential 
circumvention of Section 3’s letter and intent has been the norm. 70  
Presidents may deem it easier in most instances to ask for forgiveness (if that 
becomes necessary), than to ask for permission through consultation.  In 
response, lawmakers have scrutinized presidential non-adherence to the 
consultation mandate and have protested inadequate consultation. 71  
Members have had ample opportunities to raise executive evasions of the 
consultation requirements over the years, given the routine violation of 
Section 3 and the frequency with which U.S. armed forces have entered 
situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities.72  Legislators have utilized a 
full range of legislative actions (e.g., introducing and seeking to pass bills, 
resolutions, and amendments), and non-legislative actions (e.g., making floor 
speeches and substantive statements in hearings, writing letters to the 
executive and to fellow legislators, grandstanding, framing opinion, and 
filing lawsuits), in confronting White House non-compliance with the 
WPR.73  The following four brief examples illustrate typical congressional 
responses to executive disregard for Section 3.  As these examples 
demonstrate, although members generally assume a reactive approach, 
emphasizing the situation at hand, members also occasionally focus their 
efforts on how to ensure consultation in subsequent missions. 
First, after President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 hostage rescue attempt—
undertaken with no prior consultation—the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (most notably) held hearings to rebuke the administration for its 
lack of consultation.74  The Committee also briefly considered, but ultimately 
did not establish, guidelines regarding future consultation.75  Second, the 
absence of consultation in President Ronald Reagan’s Persian Gulf 
reflagging and escort operation triggered legislators’ complaints about     
executive non-adherence and prompted the Senate to pass an amendment  
 
                                                
 70. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 71. Burgin, supra note 19, at 223–31. 
 72. Presidents submitted 132 WPR reports to Congress from the passage of the WPR in 
1973 through President Obama’s final WPR report regarding Libya on June 15, 2011.  See 
Eileen Burgin, War Over Words: Reinterpreting “Hostilities” and the War Powers 
Resolution, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. (forthcoming Fall 2014).  The vast majority of these reports 
addressed situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities, thus suggesting that consultation 
should have occurred.  See generally id. 
 73. Burgin, supra note 19, at 223–31.  
 74. See generally Hearing on the Situation in Iran, supra note 28. 
 75. Id. at iii. 
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requiring an extensive report before implementation of the U.S.-Kuwaiti 
reflagging agreement.76 
Third, President George H. W. Bush’s circumvention of the consultation 
mandate in the buildup to the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War inspired multiple 
noteworthy congressional actions.  Democrats and Republicans alike publicly 
chastised the President; even former Representative William Broomfield (R-
MI), longtime friend of the President and ranking Foreign Affairs Committee 
member, “angrily charged that the administration’s failure to consult more 
closely with key lawmakers ‘is the main reason support for the policy is 
eroding.’”77  And fear that the White House would commence a war without 
consultation while Congress was adjourned drove the House and Senate 
leadership to form a joint, bipartisan congressional consultation body for use 
during adjournment.  Former House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, 
Dante Fascell (D-FL), explained, 
 
[I]n our meetings with Bush [probably taking place because 
of the WPR] we asked him to set up such a consultative 
group on his own.  We even told the administration to name 
whoever they wanted to be in the group, but the 
administration didn’t act. . . . So the leadership took it on 
themselves to do it.”78 
 
Fourth, lawmakers’ unease in 1995 over President Bill Clinton’s 
consultation violations regarding Bosnia prompted numerous congressional 
actions.  Members, for instance, made floor speeches on consultation,79 sent 
letters (with GOP leadership support) to the President imploring him “to 
consult earnestly and forthrightly,” 80  inserted a conference committee 
provision into the FY 1996 Defense Department Appropriations bill 
requiring consultation before deploying armed forces to Bosnia,81 and added 
a prohibition into the FY 1996 State, Commerce, and Justice Appropriations 
measure against using any of the bill’s funds for sending troops to Bosnia 
                                                
 76. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF., 101ST CONG., REP. ON CONG. AND FOREIGN 
POL’Y 1987 40–42 (Comm. Print 1989). 
 77. Carroll Doherty, Uncertain Congress Confronts President’s Gulf Strategy, CQ WKLY., 
Nov. 17, 1990, at 3879–80.  
 78. Telephone interview with former Rep. Dante Fascell, Chairman, H. Comm. of Foreign 
Aff. (Aug. 25, 1993). 
 79. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 14271–72 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 17517–18 (1995); 141 
CONG. REC. 17525–26 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 18679–82 (1995). 
 80. 141 CONG. REC. 14271–72 (1995). 
 81. The House rejected the conference report over matters unrelated to Bosnia.  See 
GRIMMETT, supra note 17, at 31–32.  
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without advance congressional approval.82  Displeasure over the status quo 
on consultation even motivated a group of senior congressional leaders to 
introduce proactive legislation to try to ensure future consultation.83 
 
IV.  THE LIBYA CRISIS: A BRIEF RECAP OF RELEVANT EVENTS 
 
On February 23, 2011, in his first public remarks on the anti-government 
rebellion in Libya, President Obama indicated that he was considering a full 
range of options.84  He imposed economic sanctions on Libya two days 
later.85  On February 26, the U.N. Security Council acted by approving 
Resolution 1970, which demanded an end to the violence, and imposed an 
arms embargo on Libya and a travel ban and assets freeze on Muammar al 
Qadhafi’s family.86   The Senate responded, as well, by passing Senate 
Resolution 85 on March 1; the resolution condemned Libya’s human rights 
violations and encouraged the U.N. to protect civilians.87 
When this initial flurry of activity failed to improve the situation, 
international pressure mounted on Qadhafi.  The U.N. Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17, establishing a no-fly zone in Libyan 
airspace, authorizing strong enforcement of Resolution 1970’s arms 
embargo, and encouraging member states to protect civilians without 
occupying Libya.88  President Obama commenced OOD on March 19 as the 
U.S. contribution to enforce a no-fly zone and safeguard civilians.89  He 
reported to Congress on March 21, “consistent with” the WPR, that he had 
directed U.S. forces to act “with the support of European allies and Arab 
                                                
 82. Id. 
 83. See, e.g., Peace Powers Act of 1995, S. 5, 104th Cong. (1995).  The Peace Powers Act 
of 1995 would have repealed the WPR but re-enacted the WPR’s consultation and reporting 
provisions. 
 84. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Libya (Feb. 23, 2011) 
[hereinafter Remarks on Libya], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/02/23/remarks-president-libya. 
 85. Helene Cooper & Mark Landler, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Libya in Wake of 
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/ 
middleeast/26diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 86. Press Release, U.N. Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council 
Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of 
Crackdown on Protestors (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ 
sc10187.doc.htm.  The name of Muammar al Qadhafi is transliterated in various ways.  This 
Article refers to him as Qadhafi, except when a quoted source spells his name differently. 
 87. 155 CONG. REC. S1068–69 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011). 
 88. Press Release, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authorizing ‘All 
Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, By Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions (Mar. 
17, 2011), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm [hereinafter No-Fly 
Zone]. 
 89. See Commencement of Military Operations Against Libya, supra note 2. 
190 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 12, No. 2 
 
partners” as part of an international effort authorized by the U.N. Security 
Council.90  He further claimed that the air strikes were taken pursuant to his 
“constitutional authority,” and were to be limited in “nature, duration, and 
scope.”91  In his March 28 national address, President Obama reiterated the 
objectives of establishing a no-fly zone, stopping Qadhafi’s forces, and 
responding to the humanitarian crisis.92  NATO assumed (at least nominal) 
command of coalition military operations on March 31 with the start of 
OUP.93 
The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a 
memorandum opinion on April 1 that President Obama’s use of force was 
constitutional because he “could reasonably determine” that it was in the 
“national interest,” and that prior congressional approval was not required for 
the “limited operations under consideration.” 94   The administration also 
suggested that congressional prerogatives were not implicated for several 
reasons: (1) U.S. participation in OUP was limited, and becoming 
progressively more so; (2) the intervention was unlikely to expose Americans 
to attack, especially given the mission’s reliance on missiles and drones; and 
(3) the operation was likely to end quickly, and the WPR permits the 
executive “to use force for up to 60 days without congressional approval.”95  
While President Obama was claiming the absence of “hostilities,” however, 
the Pentagon added $225 per month in hazard pay for service members 
flying sorties over Libya or stationed within 110 nautical miles of Libya’s 
shores.96  And when the U.S. military involvement exceeded the WPR’s 
sixty-day clock, President Obama modified his justification for action, 
underscoring the U.S. supporting role after transferring responsibility to 
NATO.97 
Congress responded with increased legislative activity.  On June 3, the 
House defeated a resolution directing President Obama to remove U.S. 
forces, and then passed a broad non-binding resolution, House Resolution 
292 (268-145), which included provisions opposing ground force 
deployment, requiring executive reports with requested information about 
OOD and OUP, and noting Congress’s constitutional power to withhold 
                                                
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. See Address to the Nation on Libya, supra note 2. 
 93. See Florence Gaub, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing 
Operation Unified Protector, LETORT PAPERS (June 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1161. 
 94. Krass Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1. 
 95. Id. at 8. 
 96. See Broder & Stern, supra note 4, at 1368–69. 
 97. See Letter on Efforts in Libya, supra note 2. 
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funding for unauthorized military missions such as in Libya.98  Although it 
did not ultimately become law, the House approved an amendment on June 
13 that prohibited the use of any funds in association with U.S. involvement 
in Libya in contravention of the WPR.99  The next day, Speaker John 
Boehner (R-OH) sent President Obama a letter warning that the WPR clock 
was expiring and asking for his legal basis for continuing action.100 
President Obama answered in his June 15 WPR Report to Congress, 
claiming constitutional authority to act given “the important U.S. interests” 
and the mission’s anticipated “limited nature, scope and duration.” 101  
Moreover, he argued that his actions were “consistent” with the WPR and did 
not require congressional authorization because the operation lacked the kind 
of “hostilities” contemplated by the law’s sixty-day clock.102  Specifically, 
qualities such as “sustained fighting,” “active exchanges of fire,” the 
“presence of U.S. ground forces,” and “U.S. casualties or a serious threat 
thereof” were absent, and the United States was “playing a constrained and 
supporting role” in a U.N. legitimated multinational coalition.103  In other 
words, the executive argued that it did not need to terminate military 
operations for two reasons: (1) the sixty-day clock stopped ticking when 
NATO assumed control on March 31; and (2) U.S. forces in OUP were not in 
“hostilities” because they were only dropping bombs from unmanned aerial 
vehicles, not fighter jets.104 
Congress again responded, but not with the administration’s desired 
action of passing the supportive resolution, sponsored by former Senator 
John Kerry (D-MA) and Senator John McCain (R-AZ), allowing the limited 
                                                
 98. H.R. Res. 292, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted). 
 99. Rep. Brad Sherman, House Votes to Comply with War Powers Act in Defense 
Spending Bill (July 7, 2011, 6:55 PM), http://www.bradsherman.house.gov/2011/07/house-
votes-to-comply-with-war-powers-act-in-defense-spending-bill.shtml [hereinafter Defense 
Spending Bill]. 
 100. Letter from John Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to President 
Barack Obama (June 14, 2011) [hereinafter Boehner Letter on Libya], available at 
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-challenges-president-obama-legal-
justification-continued-operations.  Note that Speaker Boehner’s letter was technically 
incorrect, as he had granted the President a ninety-day clock.  The WPR’s sixty-day clock may 
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Equipped Armed Forces, 2011 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 448 (June 15, 2011), 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/204673/united-states-activities-in-libya-6-15-11.pdf 
[hereinafter June 15 WPR Report]. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Robert Chesney, A Primer on the Libya/War Powers Resolution Compliance Debate, 
BROOKINGS INST. (June 17, 2011), available at http:// www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/ 
0617_war_powers_chesney.aspx?p=1; see generally Burgin, supra note 72. 
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use of U.S. military force in Libya for one year.105  On June 24, the House 
defeated two measures: House Joint Resolution 68, which was based on the 
Kerry-McCain language;106 and House Resolution 2278, which would have 
ended direct U.S. combat activity in Libya while remaining supportive of 
NATO’s efforts.107  The Senate, meanwhile, never considered the Kerry-
McCain proposal—when Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) sought to raise 
it during a July debt ceiling crisis impasse, senior GOP members stymied 
him, arguing that “the budget crisis was more pressing.”108  The House, in 
contrast, continued sending mixed signals during early July votes on defense 
appropriations bill amendments.  It prohibited funding equipment and 
training for rebels seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow, yet stopped short of 
defunding the U.S. role in OUP.109  Congress thus failed to rein in President 
Obama before Qadhafi died on October 20, and OUP ended on October 31. 
 
V.  THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE WPR’S CONSULTATION  
PROVISIONS AND U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA 
 
Meaningful consultation neither occurred nor was demanded regarding 
U.S. involvement in Libya.  President Obama disregarded the law’s letter and 
spirit, despite his previous contention when he was a senator that the 
President must adhere to the consultation mandate before using force.110  
Congress, moreover, did not insist upon compliance or even highlight the 
administration’s violation.  As Barack Obama also stated when serving in the 
Senate, “No law can give Congress a backbone if it refuses to stand up as the 
co-equal branch the Constitution made it.”111 
                                                
 105. S. Res. 20, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 106. H.R.J. Res. 68, 112th Cong. (2011) (authorizing the President to continue the use of 
U.S. armed forces in Libya but for limited purposes). 
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2014 WHERE’S THE CONSULTATION? 193 
 
A. Presidential Non-Compliance with the Consultation Mandate 
 
An examination of critical junctures in the Libya crisis underscores that 
President Obama never sought legislators’ advice and opinions when 
decisions were pending; rather, the administration simply testified before 
committees and briefed members and staff about its approach and ongoing 
operations.112  As former Senator John Ensign (R-NV) stressed on the Senate 
floor, “The administration unilaterally developed, planned, and executed its 
no-fly zone policy.  The President consulted with the United Nations, he 
consulted with NATO, he consulted with the Arab League, but he did not 
consult with . . . the U.S. Congress.”113 
 Consultation should have commenced in the early days when the 
administration was first establishing the direction of U.S. policy.  President 
Obama acknowledged considering all possible forms of intervention in his 
February 23 speech.114  Given that intervention in the Libyan civil war 
suggests that U.S. forces might be in hostilities or imminent hostilities, 
President Obama was required to consult with Congress.115  Yet by the 
executive’s own account in the June 15 WPR Report, it did not consult 
Congress.116 
 During the pre-OOD period from the end of February until March 19, the 
administration engaged U.N. members and consulted with foreign leaders.117  
White House Chief of Staff Bill Daley explained, “The President knows that 
the ultimate decision he has to make at times is to put men and women in 
harm’s way, and you do that only with great consultation with your allies.”118  
While consulting allies about what the administration perceived as a situation 
                                                                                                               
statement at DePaul University, suggesting that Congress must take action to ensure then 
President George W. Bush’s compliance with the law during the Iraq War). 
 112. See e.g., June 15 WPR Report, supra note 101. 
 113. 157 CONG. REC. S1952 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2011). 
 114. See Remarks on Libya, supra note 84 (explaining that the Obama administration was 
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march/#.UvztdHlN1uY). 
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of hostilities or imminent hostilities, according to its own June 15 WPR 
Report, the executive merely arranged “conference calls with congressional 
staff” to offer “updates,” provided classified and unclassified “briefings” and 
“updates” to legislators and key staff, and “testified” at hearings.119  The 
administration wrote that President Obama did not even brief congressional 
leaders until March 18,120 once the international efforts had provided the 
foundation for OOD.121  All of these meetings and conference calls were 
notification of a policy, not consultation.122  The administration, nonetheless, 
deemed this adequate “compliance in terms of consultation,” in the words of 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates when he appeared before the House Armed 
Services Committee, because “having the leadership of the Congress in the 
very next day seemed . . . pretty prompt.”123 
 The President did not consult with Congress during OOD, which 
spanned from March 19 - March 31.124  Yet with the executive’s later 
rationale that the United States was not engaged in “hostilities” once it began 
“playing a constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition,” it 
implicitly acknowledged that during OOD, a hostile or imminently hostile 
situation existed.125  In the first week of OOD with B-2 stealth planes 
dropping bombs and about two hundred missiles being launched from 
submarines in the Mediterranean,126 President Obama merely submitted a 
report to Congress “consistent with” the WPR and verbally updated 
lawmakers. 127   According to administration testimony, notification of a 
policy was tantamount to consultation: “the President consulted immediately 
after the decision was made.”128  In addition, members subsequently received 
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 126. Kevin Baron, For the U.S., War Against Qaddafi Cost Relatively Little: $1.1 Billion, 
THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 21, 2011, 9:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/print/2011/ 
10/for-the-us-war-against-qaddhafi-cost-relatively-little-11-billion/247133/. 
 127. Commencement of Military Operations Against Libya, supra note 2. 
 128. Hearing on Operation Odyssey Dawn, supra note 5, at 44 (emphasis added); see also 
Libya: Defining U.S. National Security Interests: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign 
Aff., 112th Cong. 44 (2011) (statement of Dep’y Sec’y of State James Steinberg) (“But I 
would say that we consulted the Congress, we provided the notification that is consistent with 
the War Powers Act within 48 hours after the beginning of hostilities.”). 
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briefings, but deemed their content inadequate.  As former Senator Pete 
Sessions (R-TX) griped, “Frankly, I did not get a lot out of [the March 30 
classified] briefing. . . . We turned on the television this morning, and we saw 
news about the CIA involvement there. . . . It would have been nice to have 
heard it straight from the administration’s leaders, rather than seeing it on 
television.”129 
 From the end of March with the commencement of OUP until early June 
as hostilities in Libya escalated, the executive branch, based on its June 15 
WPR Report, continued communicating with Congress only via testimony at 
hearings, briefings, phone calls, and e-mails; however, the verbiage during 
this period shifted to lauding its own consultation.130  Press Secretary Jay 
Carney contended sixty days after the United States intervened, in his May 2 
press briefing, that President Obama “believes that consultation with 
Congress in matters like these is vital, and that’s why he has consulted so 
regularly with Congress and will continue to do so.”131  Legislators perceived 
the administration’s minimal interactions with members, though, as 
qualitatively sub-par, with the executive failing to provide information that 
members needed.132  The United States was OUP’s largest contributor: the 
United States performed seventy percent of reconnaissance missions and 
over seventy-five percent of refueling flights as of mid-May;133 the United 
States provided unique forms of assistance “including but not limited to 
armed drones;”134 U.S. forces had “a sporadic but continuing role in direct 
uses of force;”135 and a U.S. officer commanded NATO forces that were 
involved in “hostilities.”136  But consultation occurred neither in May as 
“U.S. and NATO forces carried out some of the heaviest bombardments of 
Tripoli of the entire war,”137 nor at the beginning of June, as NATO  
 
                                                
 129. 157 CONG. REC. S2010 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2011) (statement of Sen. Pete Sessions). 
 130. See June 15 WPR Report, supra note 101, at 26–28. 
 131. Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Jay Carney (May 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/20/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-
carney-5202011. 
 132. Interview with two senior Republican staff (anonymity requested), in Wash., D.C. 
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 133. Jeremy Lemer & Christine Spolar, Pentagon Sees Libya Military Costs Soar, FIN. 
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 134. Chesney, supra note 104. 
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 136. See id. (providing further analysis of the implications of Admiral James G. Stavridis of 
the U.S. Navy serving as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander and directing NATO troops in 
Libya). 
 137. Complaint ¶ 77, Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-
01096), 2011 WL 2349072. 
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maneuvers included “direct combat operations against Libyan ground 
forces”138 and “attack helicopters.”139 
The administration also did not consult Congress on several key 
decisions in June.140  President Obama simply informed Congress in his June 
15 WPR Report of the OUP extension through September.141  And there was 
no consultation regarding the shift in OUP’s goal from only defending 
civilians to ousting Qadhafi, which made the mission more offensive and 
ventured into territory not explicitly authorized by a U.N. resolution; instead, 
the executive merely distinguished the “diplomatic goal” of regime change 
from the military mission of protecting civilians.142  In addition, President 
Obama continued claiming that he had complied with Section 3, stating at a 
June 29 news conference, “Throughout this process we’ve consulted with 
Congress.  We’ve had 10 hearings on it.  We’ve released reams of 
information about the operation.  I’ve had members of Congress over to talk 
about it.  So a lot of this fuss is politics.”143 
 
B. Congressional Response: Acquiescence and Passivity 
 
Despite both the absence of meaningful consultation and its importance 
for achieving co-determination, Congress’s WPR focus during the Libya 
crisis was not on consultation.  In prior military interventions, in contrast, 
members consistently responded to presidential violations of Section 3 with 
legislative and non-legislative actions.144  Yet in the Libya crisis, members 
criticized the administration’s non-compliance with the WPR without 
                                                
 138. Id. ¶ 79. 
 139. Id. ¶ 80. 
 140. See generally June 15 WPR Report, supra note 101. 
 141. See id. at 13. 
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danger.”  Marc Ambinder, Obama Follows Bush Playbook on Libya, NAT’L J., 1, 12 (2011).  
Given opinions such as these, one might argue that the White House went “lawyer shopping” 
to find a body to justify its interpretation. 
 144. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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concentrating on consultation. 145   And when legislators discussed 
consultation, they often conflated it with notification, expressing greater and 
more frequent distress over the perceived poor quality of briefings than over 
the lack of real consultation.146  Members’ discontent increased as U.S. 
involvement in OUP extended beyond the sixty-day deadline; notably, 
however, they did not demand, or even seek, consultation on subsequent 
decisions.147  A review of lawmakers’ legislative and non-legislative efforts 
regarding Libya and the WPR illustrates their inattention to consultation. 
 Neither the House nor the Senate considered any binding or non-binding 
legislative measure revolved around ensuring presidential adherence to 
Section 3.  For instance, Senate Resolution 85, passed after President 
Obama’s initial consultation violation, centered on Libya and the U.N. rather 
than on the lack of consultation.148  Once the administration had established 
clear patterns of non-compliance with consultation obligations and 
incomplete notifications, instead of addressing the consultation evasions and 
mandating compliance, the House cleared House Resolution 292, which only 
directed executive officials to send pertinent records from communications 
with Congress. 149   The House also approved Libya funding-related 
amendments (unrelated to consultation) to the defense appropriations bill in 
June and July, although they were deleted from the final law.150  The one 
measure that would have authorized the limited use of force in Libya—
Senate Joint Resolution 20—did contain a minor provision requiring frequent 
consultation; however, the full Senate never considered it and the House 
defeated a similar measure.151 
 Members displayed the same disregard for consultation in their non-
legislative activities.  A review of floor speeches reveals this phenomenon.  
Of the over one hundred representatives making floor remarks regarding the 
WPR and Libya (many of them on multiple occasions), only eleven (under 
three percent of the House membership), mentioned consultation.152  Some of 
these legislators simply used the word “consultation” once, others merely 
quoted the WPR’s text, and still others confused consultation with 
notification.  Representative Phil Gingrey (R-GA), for instance, complained, 
                                                
 145. But see, e.g., Hearing on Operation Odyssey Dawn, supra note 5, at 9. 
 146. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. H3996 (daily ed. June 3, 2011) (statement of Rep. Phil 
Gingrey).  
 147. See, e.g., Hearing on Libya and War Powers, supra note 68, at 6–7. 
 148. S. Res. 85, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted). 
 149. H.R. Res. 292, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 150. Defense Spending Bill, supra note 99. 
 151. H.R.J. Res. 68, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 152. I searched the House portion of the Congressional Record reading debates and 
representatives’ inserted statements, looking for remarks on consultation.  A University of 
Vermont student of mine conducted an independent search to ensure accuracy. 
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“I don’t know who the President notified in regard to this operation.  What 
did he do—send a tweet to the chairmen?”153  While proportionately more 
senators made floor statements mentioning consultation—perhaps because 
senators perceived President Obama’s violation as a greater affront since he 
had been a senator154—it still was discussed infrequently.155  And several of 
the approximately ten senators who alluded to consultation conflated it with 
informing Congress.  Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) displayed this tendency 
when he explained on the chamber floor that the President invited the 
leadership via conference call “to listen to a briefing from the Situation 
Room. . . . [T]he War Powers Act, requires the President to notify Congress 
when he initiates this form of military action.”156 
 In addition, in the over half-dozen relevant committee hearings from 
March through June 2011, consultation received minimal consideration.157  
Even in hearings with the most extended discussions about consultation, just 
a few members broached the issue, legislators’ remarks prompted only brief 
exchanges, lawmakers’ criticisms lacked specific requests that might 
encourage improved consultation, and executive officials’ unresponsiveness 
to congressional concerns provoked neither concrete member action nor 
explicit member appeals.  For example, when responding to Representative 
Steve Chabot’s (R-OH) criticism about the absence of consultation when 
adequate opportunity existed, the administration equated consultation with 
notification, claiming that it had consulted by providing “the notification that 
is consistent with the War Powers Act.”158  When Representative Adam 
Smith (D-WA) suggested that discussions should not wait until final 
decisions are made, Secretary Gates attempted to justify the administration’s 
actions by noting that in subsequent executive branch talks with Congress, 
members did not raise “a single question . . . that wasn’t debated intensively 
during the administration’s deliberations.”159  Neither of these statements by 
the administration elicited congressional responses highlighting their 
                                                
 153. 157 CONG. REC. H3996 (daily ed. June 3, 2011) (statement of Rep. Phil Gingrey). 
 154. Telephone interview with senior Democratic aide (anonymity requested) (May 4, 
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erroneous underpinnings.  And in his introductory speech in a Foreign 
Relations Committee hearing, former Senator Lugar briefly turned to 
consultation, merely labeling the dialogue with Congress as “perfunctory, 
incomplete, and dismissive of reasonable requests,” without seeking or 
insisting on improved administration compliance.160 
 Members’ letters to the executive and to fellow legislators, expressing 
various complaints about executive non-compliance with the WPR, expose 
the same disregard for consultation.  The one condemnation of the 
administration’s evasion of Section 3 appeared in Speaker Boehner’s letter to 
President Obama about the expiration of the WPR clock, in which he also 
articulated unhappiness with the “lack of genuine consultation prior to 
commencement of operations.”161  Nonetheless, after this one comment about 
consultation in a letter dedicated to the WPR’s automatic withdrawal 
provision, Speaker Boehner made no concrete requests pertaining to 
consultation on Libya or specific proposals to ensure compliance with 
Section 3 in future endeavors.162 
 The least common non-legislative activity regarding the WPR is lawsuits 
against the executive.  Former Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) and 
Representative Walter Jones (R-NC), along with eight colleagues, filed a 
lawsuit against President Obama on June 15, 2011, alleging that he had 
violated the Constitution and the WPR.163  They contended that President 
Obama had “unilaterally attacked Libya and provided military assistance to 
Libyan rebels without congressional authorization or consultation.” 164  
Because of the lawsuit’s extensive claims for relief, though, the single 
mention of “consultation” was insignificant.  And following precedent, the 
court found that the case did not present a matter for judicial resolution.165   
Finally, while not specifically targeting consultation, it is relevant that a 
few legislators critiqued their own institution and acknowledged Congress’s 
inadequate response to the crisis.  In the words of former Senator Jim Webb 
(D-VA), Congress “could not even bring itself to have a formal debate on 
whether the use of military force was appropriate.”166  The Senate passed 
                                                
 160. Hearing on Libya and War Powers, supra note 68, at 6–7 (statement of Sen. Dick 
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Senate Resolution 85, condemning Libya’s human rights violations and 
encouraging the U.N. to protect Libyan civilians, for instance, with only 
thirty-five seconds of consideration.167  Lawmakers also underscored the 
communication problems between the rank-and-file membership and the 
leadership.  Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN) commented in the House 
Armed Services Committee hearing, “Many people have wondered about the 
lack of adequate notice to this body.  Well, the leadership in each party was 
informed promptly after the President’s decision.  So perhaps we should 
question our own contact with our own party leadership.”168 
 
C. Summary Comments on Compliance with Section 3 
 
The Obama administration circumvented its consultation obligations; the 
executive simply informed members of its decisions and deemed that 
adequate compliance.  Legislators’ advice and opinions could never 
influence presidential actions, however, because meetings were not convened 
to deliberate pending choices.  Despite this, Congress did not demand 
adherence to the WPR’s consultation provisions. 
Might the exigencies of the moment have prevented consultation?  As 
discussed earlier,169  given that the WPR requires consultation “in every 
possible instance,” this just might have been an occasion in which 
consultation was not attainable.  In this case, though, sufficient time did exist 
for consultation.  From the initial February decision to consider a range of 
options, through OOD and OUP, President Obama and his team talked with 
leaders around the world. 170   Consulting with fellow Americans, often 
situated only a mile plus up Pennsylvania Avenue to Capitol Hill, thus did 
not present an insurmountable obstacle.  Instead, the executive chose to 
follow precedent and construe Section 3 narrowly, and Congress acquiesced. 
If timing did not impede consultation, did the Libya intervention fail to 
meet the necessary standard of consultation—namely, forces being 
introduced into or continuing to engage in situations of hostilities or 
imminent hostilities?  Based on the “hostilities” exception the administration 
attempted to carve out in its June 15 WPR Report (and using its own 
rationale in the Report regarding what constitutes hostilities under the WPR), 
the White House implicitly acknowledged that the initial U.S. mission of 
OOD was the sort of situation contemplated by the WPR authors as hostile: 
                                                                                                               
must-ok-military-intervention.html. 
 167. See 157 CONG. REC. S1068–69 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011). 
 168. Hearing on Operation Odyssey Dawn, supra note 5, at 32 (statement of Rep. Jim 
Cooper). 
 169. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 170. See, e.g., Daley Interview, supra note 118. 
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the United States was commanding its own operation with American forces, 
intervening militarily in response to a civil war.171  Harold Koh was more 
explicit on this matter, explaining in congressional testimony that under 
OOD, U.S. military actions “were significantly more intensive, sustained, 
and dangerous” than under NATO’s OUP; therefore, Koh admitted that if 
OOD had “lasted for more than 60 days, it may well have constituted 
‘hostilities’ under the War Powers Resolution’s pullout provision.”172  Hence, 
the absence of a hostile or potentially hostile situation did not preclude 
consultation in February and March.  And considering the questions 
surrounding the legitimacy of the administration’s June re-interpretation of 
“hostilities,”173 it also is reasonable to suggest that President Obama was 
required to consult regularly for OUP because the hostile situation continued.  
Furthermore, in light of the executive’s broad definition of “imminence” in 
its subsequent 2013 legal justification of drone strikes,174 the existence of 
“imminent” hostilities throughout the Libya crisis (therefore requiring 
consultation), cannot be denied. 
When President Obama nonetheless merely provided legislators with 
after-the-fact briefings and post-hoc justifications about decisions (albeit 
incomplete), Congress had few options.  Congress was, in effect, presented 
with a fait accompli.  As an aide to former Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison 
griped,  
 
Even in classified settings, they wouldn’t say how many 
sorties had been conducted, how much ammunition we had 
used, how we determined targets, who decides on targets, 
and so much more.  Their stall tactics precluded Congress’s 
involvement and oversight, but there really wasn’t anything 
we could do about it. . . . The only thing to do would be to 
defund the operation, but there wasn’t the support for that.175 
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And as discussed above,176 even if the votes existed to defund the mission, 
that might not have restrained President Obama.177 
 
VI.  EXPLORING CONGRESS’S INATTENTION TO CONSULTATION 
 
President Obama’s actions in Libya aroused congressional interest in the 
WPR broadly.  Whether members’ concerns were procedural or substantive, 
lawmakers believed that the WPR presented a convenient foil, provided a 
tool to try to hold the President accountable, facilitated a legitimate 
conversation about Congress’s role, offered a framework to play out 
congressional disagreements, forced a national discussion, had been 
considered by President Obama, and much more.178  During the crisis, former 
Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) stated that the WPR has become a 
“political tool that allows members of Congress to dodge taking a position on 
the intervention itself . . .  argu[ing] the process rather than the substance.”179  
For some Democrats typically aligned with President Obama, criticizing 
WPR non-compliance may have been easier, politically, than condemning 
specific substantive policies.  And for some GOP lawmakers, President 
Obama’s WPR violations supplied “just another political opportunity” to 
oppose a President they were dedicated to “limiting to one term.” 180  
Republican silence on the WPR, moreover, could be problematic, prompting 
charges of ceding power to a Democratic President and complicity in 
committing more Americans to another costly war.  Members’ perceptions 
that constituents and supporters wanted Congress to have a stronger voice on 
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7, 2012). 
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Libya, further motivated members of both parties to focus on the WPR.181  
The WPR supplies the ideal instrument for legislators to address and placate 
such perceived constituent desires, without having their actions be construed 
as weakening our nation’s military. 
Despite complaints about the administration’s lack of adherence to the 
WPR generally, Congress did not publicly and clearly denounce the evasion 
of Section 3.  Given the importance of consultation in the WPR framework 
for achieving the law’s stated purpose, this absence of congressional 
attention is striking.  To understand why President Obama’s failure to consult 
did not fuel the usual congressional protest, I consider the timing of the crisis 
(beginning during a congressional recess), characteristics of the Libya 
mission (and the domestic and international context in which it occurred), the 
dynamics of the 112th Congress, and how real consultation would entail 
members acting counter to inherent political incentives.  No single factor can 
fully explain why Congress did not, at a minimum, showcase President 
Obama’s disregard for Section 3; instead, the confluence of these variables 
contributed to congressional inaction.  This is not to suggest, however, that 
all lawmakers were oblivious to the administration’s circumvention of its 
consultation obligations; a few senators “soured on Libya because they 
weren’t consulted at the beginning,” and were “insulted that Obama went 
internationally to get approval but just gave Congress information.”182  Yet 
this displeasure did not incite much of a response. 
 
A. Timing: Congressional Recess 
 
The timing of both the Libyan rebellion and President Obama’s initial 
failure to consult, depressed members’ reactions.  The critical juncture for 
consultation is before commencing action, when a President is weighing 
policy choices.  Although the WPR requires consultation regularly 
throughout a mission’s duration, early consultation is the most likely catalyst 
for co-determination.  Timing is of the essence; if a President sidesteps 
consultation from the beginning and Congress is to seek meaningful redress, 
Congress must respond when decisions are still pending.  President Obama’s 
February 23 announcement that he was considering multiple options given 
the revolt in Libya, however, occurred during a congressional recess.183  Two 
days later, when President Obama imposed economic sanctions on Libya,  
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and three days later, when the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 
1970, members remained outside of Washington, D.C. 
 Theoretically, consultation can occur without the physical presence of 
members on Capitol Hill.  President Obama did, in fact, consult with French, 
Italian, and British leaders on February 24 despite their locations abroad.184  
But if a President does not consult legislators and Congress is not in session, 
the congressional recess hinders members’ ability to react.  This is what 
happened immediately after February 23.  Lawmakers could neither 
introduce legislation nor act on legislation that might beget or even 
encourage consultation.  When the Senate reconvened on February 28 and 
the House reconvened on March 1, both the policy direction and the pattern 
of consulting with foreign nations—but not with Congress—had been 
established.  Certainly, during the recess, members and staff could have 
started planning hearings for March, sent letters to the administration, or 
begun crafting lawsuits to file against President Obama; however, hearings 
were delayed, and letters and lawsuits are less common non-legislative 
activities.185 
 If Congress had been in session when President Obama began 
confronting the violence in Libya, it is more likely that individual members 
with an understanding of Section 3’s letter and intent would have responded.  
In prior cases, as discussed above,186 Presidents have sparked congressional 
activity when they placed the United States on the brink of military 
involvement without consultation.  In late February 2011, lawmakers in 
Washington, D.C. similarly might have introduced (and perhaps approved) 
legislation as they had regarding the Persian Gulf reflagging and escort 
operation187 and Bosnia,188 convened hearings as they did in response to 
President Carter’s hostage rescue attempt,189 taken to the floor to denounce 
the President’s military endeavors as occurred in reaction to President 
Clinton’s initiatives in Somalia,190 and so much more.  This is not to imply 
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that Congress as a collective body would have demanded adherence to the 
consultation mandate regarding Libya, but it is simply to note that a greater 
number of members might have scrutinized President Obama’s disregard for 
the consultation requirement more carefully. 
 
B. The Libya Mission Itself 
 
To appreciate members’ inattention to President Obama’s evasion of the 
consultation provisions, we also need to consider the Libya mission and the 
context in which it occurred.  Beyond the obvious impact of pressing 
domestic policy problems and pre-existing foreign policy entanglements, 
public opinion, congressional concerns about other WPR provisions, and 
confusion regarding the U.S. objectives in Libya all inhibited Congress from 
protesting President Obama’s failure to consult. 
First, the Libyan rebellion occurred at a time when congressional 
attention was focused intensely on other matters.  Most importantly, it 
unfolded alongside major controversies over raising the debt limit and 
spending, and talk of a potential government shutdown. 191   Although 
competing priorities are inevitable, these financial issues consumed Congress 
to a new degree; it was not “politics as usual” as rank-and-file Republicans 
were willing “to let a default [on the national debt] happen as a negotiating 
chip.”192  Moreover, internationally, the United States was still engaged in 
two costly and unpopular wars,193 the perilous global economic situation 
persisted,194 and the tumultuous Arab spring (with its democratic uprisings 
across the Arab world) was ongoing.195  Given that “time is [members’] most 
precious commodity, and . . . [a]llocating time requires exceedingly tough 
personal and political choices,”196 these domestic and international problems, 
which dominated members’ radar screens, undoubtedly deterred 
consultation-related activity. 
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 Second, public opinion further restrained many members.  In March 
2011, forty-seven percent of Americans approved of U.S. actions in Libya 
and thirty-seven percent disapproved,197  with little difference in opinion 
between Democrats and Republicans.198  In other words, significant intra-
party disagreement existed.  Unlike most contentious issues at that time, 
Libya divided members’ supporters in their districts and states.  Hence, 
lawmakers were wary of framing the Libya discussion in terms of 
consultation, as it might have forced them to articulate the policy preferences 
they would promote if consulted, thereby potentially alienating at least 
segments of the supportive constituency.  A safer approach to placate some 
constituents’ concerns without raising the ire of others (while still responding 
more broadly to perceived constituent interest in congressional involvement 
in decision making), was to sidestep the issue of consultation and the 
member’s particular views about the U.S. role, instead objecting, for 
instance, to yet another expensive military conflict with an uncertain time 
frame. 
 Third, the specifics of the Libya operation prompted various WPR 
provisions, rather than Section 3, to preoccupy members.  Initially, 
legislators revisited concerns about whether U.N.-endorsed action provides a 
quasi-exemption from WPR requirements—expressed regarding previous 
interventions, such as in the former Yugoslavia/Bosnia, Iraq post-1991, Haiti, 
and Somalia199—notwithstanding the fact that the WPR’s Section 8 makes 
clear it does not. 200   Early on, lawmakers also considered the WPR’s 
relevance to humanitarian missions (as addressed during entanglements in 
the former Yugoslavia/Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia), and how the law 
related to situations in which the United States was supporting a NATO 
effort (an issue raised about U.S. involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo).201   
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Later, debate raged about the expiration of the WPR clock and the 
administration’s revised definition of “hostilities.”  Speaker Boehner 
captured many critics’ sentiments: 
 
[T]he White House says there are no hostilities taking place.  
Yet we’ve got drone attacks underway.  They’re spending 
$10 million a day, part of an effort to drop bombs on 
Qadhafi’s compounds.  It just doesn’t pass the straight-face 
test in my view, that we’re not in the midst of hostilities.202 
 
 Fourth, the Libya mission’s objective was unclear and in dispute.  Was 
this a humanitarian initiative, an endeavor to ensure that Libya’s civil war did 
not threaten international peace, an operation to support an international 
coalition, a maneuver to protect vital U.S. interests, an effort to topple 
Qadhafi, or something else?  Many legislators might oppose military action 
regarding some of these objectives, although no legislator wanted to appear 
soft on Qadhafi.  Thus, with the uncertainties and divergent views about U.S. 
goals, as well as the possible multiplicity of purposes, it is intuitively logical 
that members were not clamoring for consultation; consultation would 
require them to articulate their vision of the venture’s objective and 
potentially suck them into a political and military quagmire. 
 
C. The 112th Congress 
 
The political climate in 2011 also inhibited members from focusing on 
consultation.  Extreme partisan polarization and the perpetual campaign 
mentality characterized the 112th Congress, the least productive Congress 
since 1948 when scholars began charting legislative productivity.203  The 
sharpened partisanship affected relationships within each chamber, between 
the GOP-controlled House and the Democratic Senate, and between the 
congressional Republicans and the Democratic President.204  Thomas Mann 
and Norman Ornstein lay the source of the 112th Congress’s “dysfunction” 
on “vehemently adversarial” political parties in a separation-of-powers 
government and on the GOP becoming “an insurgent outlier.”205  According 
to Mann and Ornstein, “The single-minded focus on scoring political points 
over solving problems . . . has reached a level of such intensity and bitterness 
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that the government seems incapable of taking and sustaining public 
decisions responsive to the existential challenges facing the country.”206  It is 
in this hostile and legislatively unproductive environment that Congress 
failed to assert itself regarding consultation on Libya.  A look inside each 
chamber illuminates other more specific climate-related problems that 
stymied the congressional response. 
 At first blush it might seem that President Obama’s evasion of the 
consultation requirement would be an ideal issue for many House 
Republicans; they could gain “electoral mileage” by opposing President 
Obama without needing their own “positive record of policy 
achievement.” 207   But in 2011, internecine warfare plagued the GOP 
majority, quashing its ability to reap the full benefits of its majority status.  
The “Young Guns,” led by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA), the Tea 
Party members, the eighty-seven freshmen (most elected with Tea Party 
backing), and the Republican Study Committee, routinely prevented Speaker 
Boehner from being able to fashion a GOP position, negotiate effectively 
with Democrats, and pass legislation.208  The Speaker, for instance, could not 
even garner the requisite votes in June to clear House Resolution 2278 to end 
direct U.S. combat activity in Libya, despite polls indicating that GOP 
approval for the mission had sunk to thirty-four percent.209  Considering his 
relative impotence, Speaker Boehner had to selectively calculate where to 
battle, or try to herd, his fellow partisans.  And while the Speaker finally did 
condemn President Obama’s lack of consultation, the overdue nature of his 
criticism (in June), and the fact that he tossed the issue out as an aside in a 
letter dedicated to the WPR’s sixty-day clock, suggests that consultation was 
not a priority on which Speaker Boehner chose to expend scarce political 
capital. 
 The Speaker also undoubtedly perceived his members’ disinterest in 
Section 3, and thus had few incentives to concentrate on it.  The consultation 
mandate did not align easily with Tea Party members’ core constitutional 
message, upon which their governing to campaign mentality hinged.  Other 
GOP factions had different non-consultation priorities.  “Some just used the 
WPR because they wanted to prove that Obama was wrong because they 
opposed military endeavors led by Democratic Presidents.  Others didn’t 
want to have to vote.  A few used the WPR as a demagoguery tool.  And the  
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splits continued from there.”210  No House Republican group, though, was 
seeking to highlight President Obama’s consultation violations. 
 In the Senate, venomous partisanship and the “permanent campaign”211 
consumed members and hampered the body from demanding consultation, or 
at least rebuking the executive for failing to consult.  It seems intuitively 
logical that Senate Republicans might have had the most interest in 
underscoring the lack of consultation, or even achieving real consultation—
reflexive opposition to a Democratic President and the constant campaign, 
combined with senators’ individualism and sense of importance in the 
smaller upper chamber with its elevated foreign policy role on some issues.  
However, as the Senate minority, the GOP could not move issues forward 
without ample Democratic support; the Republicans could only obstruct 
Senate Democratic initiatives, a power they exercised routinely in the 112th 
Congress’s hostile climate.212  And the Democratic majority, notwithstanding 
its diversity, had political incentives not to purposefully attack a fellow 
partisan in the White House and not to offer Republicans a potentially 
damaging issue for President Obama.  Such actions could hurt Senate 
Democrats electorally, a prospect too familiar in 2011 with their recent 2010 
election losses.  If a Democratic intra-party consensus regarding the 
consultation violations somehow emerged, though, Democratic senators still 
might have been wary of harping on the administration’s non-compliance 
and fueling White House wrath.  Furthermore, with Senate Republicans’ 
constant threat of a filibuster and the requisite sixty votes needed to invoke 
cloture, even majority party unity did not guarantee the passage of 
legislation. 
 Finally, it merits mention that in this highly-charged partisan climate, 
patterns of selectively targeting presidential WPR violations based on party 
allegiances continued. 213   A review of lawmakers’ floor speeches and 
remarks in hearings expose the party differences.  Over seventy-five percent 
of verbal criticisms of President Obama’s non-compliance were statements 
by Republicans.214  When a handful of Democrats did fault the administration 
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for evading the law’s mandate, their language was both less harsh and 
softened by objections to their own institution’s shortcomings (as evidenced 
in quotes above).215  GOP senators also undertook relatively more non-
legislative endeavors regarding consultation than their House counterparts, 
and their minority status in the Senate virtually ensured that words would not 
translate into binding legislative action. 
 
D. What Real Consultation Would Entail: Members Acting Counter to 
Inherent Political Incentives 
 
In exploring Congress’s muted response to President Obama’s disregard 
for Section 3, the broader issue of what real consultation would entail 
becomes relevant.  While consultation is the linchpin for collective judgment, 
and thus a key WPR provision meriting congressional scrutiny, the nature of 
consultation and characteristics of the mandate in fact may dissuade or 
discourage members from vehemently challenging Section 3 violations.  
Since the WPR’s appeal in part is as a political tool, as described earlier,216 
highlighting inadequate consultation may be counterproductive from many 
lawmakers’ perspectives: it may force them to identify the policy preferences 
they would advocate in joint deliberations; or, it may yield actual 
consultation, with members then assuming responsibility for a substantive 
policy approach, and assuming responsibility for politically risky foreign 
policies is anathema to most legislators.  A debate over process problems is 
politically safer because members do not need to declare their policy 
positions and potentially share accountability for a foreign policy debacle.  
As Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA) complained to his Foreign Affairs 
Committee colleagues, “[A] lot of [members] would just as soon duck the 
[Libya] issue.”217  It is often simpler and more politically beneficial for 
legislators to remain on the sidelines and retain the flexibility to engage in 
the “blame game,” particularly when American lives are in jeopardy. 
 Section 3’s ambiguity further diminishes Congress’s incentives to focus 
on consultation, and complicates an assertive congressional response.  As 
discussed earlier, 218  textual imprecision pervades the consultation 
obligations, with lingering questions about what constitutes consultation, 
what situations require consultation, and who represents Congress for 
consultation purposes.  Many lawmakers, therefore, do not fully comprehend 
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the consultation mandate, incorrectly conflating consultation with 
notification (as seen above in members’ public statements). 219   Also 
contributing to members’ misconceptions, all Presidents since 1973 have 
chosen to interpret consultation as notification, and few sitting members have 
the historical appreciation of the provision’s letter and intent because they 
were elected well after the WPR’s enactment and they have not read the very 
short law.220  Several staff interviewees similarly misconstrued Section 3; 
some did so, ironically, while charging that others did not understand it.221  
With this congressional confusion, legislators may perceive presidential 
violations as less flagrant than they are, consequently dampening their 
displeasure. 
 Along these lines, and not surprisingly, the public lacks awareness of the 
consultation mandate as well. 222   And because perceived supportive 
constituency opinions, desires, and potential reactions exert the principal 
influence on whether members become involved in a foreign policy issue, the 
absence of a constituent incentive is significant.223  Members influenced by 
the constituent connection to raise the WPR, therefore, are not induced to 
target consultation evasions; they are more apt to concentrate on the WPR 
broadly or on the sixty-day clock.  The automatic withdrawal clock is easier 
than consultation for the public to understand. 224   Beyond lacking a 
constituent-related motivation to highlight executive disregard for Section 3, 
consultation itself also carries electoral risks.  Specifically, it would impel 
members to identify their policy preferences and to assume responsibility for 
a military venture, without potentially commensurate electoral benefits. 
The impact of this variable—namely, the nature of consultation and 
characteristics of the mandate—on members’ responses to presidential non-
compliance has increased over time.  As the governing-to-campaign 
mentality has become the norm, members religiously calculate the electoral 
consequences of their actions, prompting them to avoid matters with clear 
political pitfalls such as targeting a President’s evasion of Section 3.  The 
diminished appreciation of the consultation provisions, enacted forty years 
ago when few current members were in Congress,225 compounds members’ 
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reticence to champion the issue.  Lawmakers personally invested in 
upholding Section 3’s letter and spirit due to their involvement in the WPR 
drafting and the memories of Vietnam it evokes, also are becoming scarce.226  
The continually expanding number of presidential precedents of not 
consulting further reinforces Congress’s tendency to acquiesce, rather than to 
try to ensure compliance.  Moreover, as the WPR has come to be viewed 
through a more partisan lens, perhaps countervailing incentives to stress 
consultation emerge only for some legislators not in the President’s party. 
 
E. Concluding Remarks on the Congressional Silence 
 
The simultaneous occurrence of four factors—the timing of the Libya 
revolt, characteristics of the U.S. operation, the 112th Congress’s political 
climate, and the nature of the consultation mandate—appear to have 
decreased members’ interest in showcasing President Obama’s inadequate 
consultation regarding Libya.  Congress’s muted response is striking, 
especially given that prior administrations’ disregard for the consultation 
mandate sparked Congress to pursue both legislative and non-legislative 
actions.  And because consultation is the prerequisite for the WPR’s key 
objective that military engagements be based on co-determination, 
Congress’s inattention to this WPR provision might appear to be counter-
intuitive. 
 
VII.  SYRIA, CONSULTATION, AND THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION 
 
When President Obama declared in August 2013, without consulting 
Congress, that a U.S. military strike against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad 
(in retaliation for his use of chemical weapons on Syrian citizens) was 
imminent, 227  Congress responded in its typical fashion.  In contrast to 
Congress’s anomalous passivity following the administration’s 
circumvention of its consultation obligation regarding Libya, in late August 
2013 (albeit during a congressional recess), lawmakers once again stressed 
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their consultation concerns.228  Conforming to the analysis above, President 
Obama’s non-compliance elevated Section 3 to the forefront of Congress’s 
WPR focus.  Notwithstanding the limitations on the legislative and non-
legislative activities that members may undertake when not in Washington, 
D.C., senators and representatives vocally admonished the White House for 
inadequate consultation.229  Speaker Boehner underscored, in an August 28, 
2013 letter to President Obama, that while “chairmen of the national security 
committees” appreciate the “initial outreach from senior administration 
officials,” “substantive consultation” has yet to occur.230  And a letter sent to 
President Obama from 116 representatives (98 Republicans and 18 
Democrats), also on August 28, began, “We strongly urge you to consult and 
receive authorization from Congress before ordering the use of U.S. military 
force in Syria.  Your responsibility to do so is prescribed in the Constitution 
and the War Powers Resolution of 1973.”231  Members concentrated, as is the 
norm, on what they viewed as sub-par consultation regarding Syria, rather 
than on any underlying weaknesses with the consultation mandate. 
 Thus, despite constraining influences—the congressional recess, the 
113th Congress’s continuing partisan polarization, and the disincentives 
inherent in the nature of consultation and the characteristics of the mandate—
legislators criticized what many perceived to be President Obama’s evasion 
of the consultation requirement.232  Various factors pertaining to the specifics 
of a possible military retaliation against Syria, and the context in which the 
U.S. military endeavor would occur, differed significantly from the Libya 
situation and helped to ignite consultation-related activity.  Congress, for 
instance, was not consumed at that time with other immediate crises, such as 
budget and debt-ceiling deadlines (although they were approaching). 233  
Moreover, public opinion was firmly opposed to a U.S. strike. 234  
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Additionally, in the absence of U.N. Security Council resolutions 
encouraging action against Syria, members were not distracted from Section 
3 by debates about U.N. resolutions’ significance vis-à-vis the WPR.  
Instead, the lack of U.N. Security Council (and broad international) support 
for a military response to the Syrian government, increased members’ 
concerns about policy formulation, highlighting the importance of 
consultation with Congress.235  The extended decision making on a mission 
not deemed to be urgent also meant that Congress had the opportunity to 
deliberate.  Congress did not have to respond at once to a commencing 
intervention. 
As the congressional calls for consultation persisted, in an unexpected 
turn of events, President Obama announced that he would seek congressional 
authorization for his planned military attack on Syria (an action he still 
claimed authority to undertake on his own).236   Without U.N. Security 
Council and tangible international backing for enforcing his “red line”—and 
facing a complex and explosive geopolitical situation, a war-weary and 
unsupportive American public wanting congressional involvement, and a no-
win political and military decision about U.S. policy237—President Obama 
chose to share the decision-making responsibility (and possibly the blame), 
with Congress.238  Some legislators did not relish this position because, as 
discussed earlier,239 members generally seek to avoid politically difficult 
votes with potentially negative electoral ramifications.  This displeasure may 
have contributed to the ironic situation of several lawmakers actually 
criticizing President Obama for turning to Congress.240  Representative Peter 
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King (R-NY) argued, “President Obama is abdicating his responsibility as 
Commander-in-Chief and undermining the authority of future Presidents. . . . 
The President doesn’t need 535 members of Congress to enforce his own red 
line.” 241   As an internationally negotiated resolution regarding Syria’s 
possession of chemical weapons began emerging in early September 2013, 
President Obama requested time to pursue a Russian proposal.242  Members 
seized the promise of diplomacy, relieved that, at least temporarily, they 
were dodging a tough floor vote.243  Even members typically skeptical of 
delegating decisions to international bodies embraced the potential 
international solution.244 
 
VIII.  LOOKING AHEAD 
 
Since 1973, presidential initiatives to use force have almost always 
aroused congressional interest in the WPR broadly, and the consultation 
requirement in particular.  The norm is for members concerned about 
institutional prerogatives, and/or a policy’s substance, to protest presidential 
violations, and to employ legislative and non-legislative mechanisms to 
rebuke the executive.  Yet during the 2011 Libya mission, the confluence of 
four influences contributed to Congress’s muted response to inadequate 
consultation.  In contrast to the Libya case, Syria presented the classic 
congressional reaction, with lawmakers criticizing President Obama for 
failing to consult.  Although the congressional recess, the political climate, 
and the nature and characteristics of the consultation obligation probably 
served as disincentives to members highlighting President Obama’s evasion 
of Section 3 in regards to Syria, features of both the Syria situation and the 
context of a U.S. response to it overrode the constraining influences.  More 
generally, then, even with a combination of deterring factors coalescing, if a 
significant cross-pressure exists, the restraining variables may not repress or 
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stymie the congressional response to a White House disregarding the 
consultation mandate.   
What does this tell us about potential congressional reactions in the 
coming years to inevitable presidential circumvention of Section 3?  Clearly, 
identical factors to those constraining Congress in the Libya case will never 
recur.  But in a subsequent military initiative, it is conceivable that similar 
elements, or even a different combination of variables, may coincide and 
inhibit legislators from challenging executive failure to consult.  At a 
minimum, the political environment and the characteristics of the 
consultation requirement will continue, for the foreseeable future, to limit 
members’ responses.  First, Congress likely will remain highly partisan with 
the permanent campaign mentality prevailing.  Most political observers agree 
that in terms of Congress’s polarization and paralysis, “the worst is probably 
yet to come.”245  Second, it is axiomatic that the consultation obligation itself 
will persist as a constraining influence, because real consultation would 
entail members acting counter to inherent political incentives.  This 
disincentive to demanding faithful consultation may become more significant 
over time; fewer legislators will have the requisite historical perspective and 
understanding of a 1973 law—and presidential reinterpretations of it—or a 
more personal investment in its enforcement and survival.  On the other 
hand, as we observed with Congress’s outcry when the Obama 
administration initially sidestepped Congress on Syria, cross-pressures 
generating congressional interest in advocating compliance with the 
consultation requirement may emerge.  It seems likely that such cross-
pressures will continue to develop, prodding members into using legislative 
and non-legislative devices to rebuke presidential circumvention of the 
consultation mandate.  The pattern of congressional behavior since 1973 is 
undeniable; members assert their prerogatives and criticize executive 
disregard for Section 3.  The congressional reaction regarding executive 
consultation violations in Libya thus appears to be an anomaly in what was, 
in 2011, an almost forty-year-old law.  Despite the potential pitfalls of 
admonishing White House evasions of Section 3, scrutinizing presidential 
non-adherence in a reactive fashion still presents members with a convenient 
political tool to attack a policy’s substance and showcase their own 
institutional powers. 
But to move beyond reactive congressional protests to actually ensuring 
meaningful consultation, thereby reaffirming the WPR’s objective of 
collective judgment, Congress must act in a proactive manner.  Precedents 
offer no indication that the Supreme Court will weigh in, and Presidents, 
generally with little motivation to consult, will continue to narrowly interpret 
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the consultation obligation except in isolated situations.246  Congress, though, 
could alter the dynamic in all instances when Presidents are deciding whether 
and how to engage militarily; through statutory change, Congress could 
directly tie funding to the President truly consulting before launching a 
military operation.  Such a law also would need to prohibit the President 
from transferring and utilizing pre-existing dollars to act militarily without 
consultation. 
 Yet legislating on consultation will not be easy.  During a military 
entanglement Congress cannot address Section 3’s fundamental 
shortcomings because the immediate crisis—not structural or statutory 
reform—requires attention.  And when a crisis situation is not consuming 
legislators and they could assume a proactive approach, other pressing 
problems dominate their radar screens.  As a Senate staffer described, 
“Legislating on War Powers is a catch-22.  When nothing is happening—
when there is not ongoing use of force—there’s no urge to do something.  
When something is happening, there’s a feeling that action must be taken—
later.”247  Moreover, the current venomous partisanship and an inevitable 
presidential veto on a structural war powers matter (that would be perceived 
by the executive as an encroachment on presidential prerogatives), present 
additional obstacles.  In a time of unified government, the majority party’s 
incentive is to work with its President; legislating on consultation would be 
viewed as confrontational and as potentially weakening the President, and 
therefore would be seen as undesirable.  Action thus is more likely with 
divided government.  Enacting reform on consultation undoubtedly would 
provoke a presidential veto, however, and Congress only has mustered the 
requisite two-thirds super-majority to override two foreign policy vetoes (one 
to pass the WPR).248  A significant precipitating event, such as an egregious 
presidential war powers violation with dire consequences, may be required 
for reform legislation to garner sufficient support from a President’s party to 
override a veto.  Consequently, for the time being, we can expect that the 
WPR consultation requirement will remain on life support; Presidents will 
not faithfully consult and Congress will chastise executive non-compliance, 
but will not take binding legislative action to ensure future, legitimate co-
determination. 
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